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The Public Piggy Bank Goes to Market:
Public Pension Fund Investment in
Common Stock and Fund Trustees'
Social Agenda
DEBORAH J. MARTIN*
Although public pension funds are to be held in trust for th
exclusive benefit of pensioners and beneficiaries, some trustees are
using the funds' tremendous financial clout to effect social change.
The use of public pension funds for this purpose violates numer-
ous state and federal statutes as well as the United States
Constitution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Public pension funds across the United States have amassed half-
a-trillion dollars in retirement funds. Pursuant to state and federal
law, these funds must be invested and reinvested in a diverse portfo-
lio of holdings to obtain the best possible return. Because of the ever-
increasing size of the portfolios, fund trustees have expanded the
types of investments into areas previously unheard of for "safe" pen-
sion investments.
Public pension funds have increased their holdings in private cor-
porations from one percent in 1950 to thirty-nine percent in 1989.1
* University of Southern California, J.D. 1990; Claremont McKenna College,
B.A. 1987. Research for this paper was sponsored by Pacific Legal Foundation's College
of Public Interest Law.
1. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PUBLIC PENSION
PLANS: THE ISSUES RAISED OVER CONTROL OF PLAN ASSETS, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. Tbl.
This ever-expanding involvement raises several questions. The pen-
sion system administrators owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries
of the funds to maximize the return on the investment. Fund invest-
ment must be based on sound economic principles. However, some
public pension funds have begun basing investments on factors such
as a corporation's stand on environmental issues, corporate govern-
ance issues (the balance of power between stockholders and manage-
ment), affirmative action, and other types of "social investing."
Federal statutory provisions in the Internal Revenue Code, the Se-
curities and Exchange Act of 1934, the Clayton Antitrust Act, and
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) also play a
role in determining the legality of certain investments. Each of these
statutes requires that the investment of pension funds be made for
the exclusive benefit of the beneficiary. The 1934 Act and the Clay-
ton Act also have reporting requirements from which institutional
investors are exempt only if they do not seek to influence the man-
agement of the corporation.
In California, the state constitution clearly prescribes a duty by
which the trustee of the pension funds must act for the sole and
exclusive benefit of the pensioners. The standard of care is that of a
prudent investor. When California public pension fund systems in-
vest in particular companies to further a social agenda, a clear con-
flict exists between those actions and the duty mandated by the state
constitution.
Social investment also raises issues under the United States Con-
stitution First Amendment Freedom of Speech and Association
Clauses. Because public employee contributions to the pension funds
are compulsory, the funds' administrators should not use those mon-
eys to make political or ideological statements. This paper argues
that pensioners have the constitutional right not to fund political ac-
tivities with which they disagree. Another concern is the extent to
which public entities should be able to control private corporations.
Until 1967, California public entities could not invest in private
corporations at all.' This rule is still used in one state,3 and other
1, at 10 (1990) [hereinafter PUBLIC PENSION PLANS] (citing EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE, QUARTERLY PENSION INVESTMENT REPORT, 4TH QUARTER 1989
(Mar. 1990)).
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 20205.2 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1992) repealed by 1983
Cal. Stat. 1043, §§ 8-10. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 20205.2 was originally added by 1967 Cal.
Stat. 1510, § 1. See also 1967 Cal. Stat. 1359, § 2 (adding CAL. GOV'T CODE § 45308.5
(Deering 1974) which authorizes investment in common stock).
3. Indiana has a constitutional provision prohibiting any investments in stocks. In-
diana voters refused to change the provision in 1986 and in the November 1990 election.
Ronald K. Snell & Susan Wolfe, Public Pension Funds' Investment Practices, LEGIS.
FIN. PAPER No. 72 (National Conference of State Legislatures and the National Associ-
ation of Legislative Fiscal Offices), Feb. 1990, at 11.
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states strictly control the type and amount of investments.' On the
federal level, the Social Security system is prohibited from investing
in the private sector because of the perceived danger of the federal
government coming to own significant parts of major corporations.5
The amount of money held by public pension funds concentrates
substantial power in "one" shareholder, especially when the public
investor chooses to become active in pursuing its own social agenda.
When the state, as a large shareholder, plays a role in corporate gov-
ernance,' the line between private enterprise and government-run
programs begins to blur.7
Pension fund investment has gone beyond simple investment in
"blue chip" common stock. Although a large percentage of the
4. For example, South Carolina restricts investments to government bonds and cor-
porate bonds rated AA, and West Virginia permits investment in fixed income domestic
investments only. Id.
5. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401(d) (1991); Public Fund Socialism, PEN-
SIONS & INVESTMENTS, Mar. 5, 1990, at 12.
6. Corporate governance is the term used to describe the internal organization of a
corporation, specifically the balance of power between stockholders and management,
This encompasses such issues as "independent" directors (directors who do not have a
financial or familial interest in the corporation or its other directors or management),
confidential voting, and proxy contests.
7. Public pension funds themselves acknowledge that simply their being a govern-
mental agency means that special interest groups will attempt to curry favor and influ-
ence investment and proxy decisions:
As special interest groups seek 'pressure points' in the public sector through
which to exert their influence, the pension funds provide an inviting target.
Groups looking to influence corporations in dealing with the environment,
animal rights, certain consumer products, foreign competition, and yet-to-be-
defined moral issues of all sorts, will lead a parade of well-intentioned followers
to the doorsteps of the pension funds. Such actions are more likely in the future
than they were in the past for several reasons:
1. Pension funds keep getting larger.
2. Pension fund activities in the corporate arena have proven that funds do
have influence and can effect change as active shareholders.
3. The Federal Government's focus on large pension funds also tends to
draw more attention to the potential influences impacting these funds.
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM INVESTMENT OFFICE, FIVE-YEAR
OUTLOOK 7, 8 (1990).
Politicians may also look to pension funds for self-serving purposes. New York Gover-
nor Mario Cuomo, referring to IRA M. MILLSTEIN & LEE SMITH, OUR MONEY'S WORTH:
THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PENSION FUND INVESTMENT (1989)
[hereinafter OUR MONEY'S WORTH], a project of the New York State Industrial Cooper-
ation Council, stated: "We have hundreds of billions of dollars and can't find money to
build jails . . . . We have hundreds of billions of dollars and we can't find money to
build roads and bridges." Id. at 11. Pension funds become a very attractive target for
spending because politicians can correctly assume, at the fund's expense, that this spend-
ing of pension fund dollars will not be missed until after they have left office. Id. at 11-
12.
money is invested in companies listed in the Standard & Poor's 500,
pension fund trustees have expanded their portfolio to include "alter-
native investments," which include leveraged buyouts, venture capi-
tal, "special situations," 8 and real estate. These high-risk invest-
ments are often inappropriate for public pension funds and jeopard-
ize the sole purpose of the pension fund - to provide benefits to
pensioners and beneficiaries upon retirement.
This article relates the various investment strategies of the Cali-
fornia Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS), the Califor-
nia State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS), and the Council
of Institutional Investors (CII), and identifies federal and state laws
that are implicated by the pension funds' actions. When certain re-
cently-implemented investment practices are laid side-by-side with
the statutes and constitutional provisions enacted to guide those
practices, the trustees' investment of pension funds appears to skirt
the very edge of the law and, in some cases, is plainly illegal.
II. PLANS FOR INVESTING IN CORPORATIONS
The following sections demonstrate just a sampling of the various
agenda that certain public pension funds are pursuing.
A. California Public Employees' Retirement System's Plan
CalPERS, established in the 1930s, is a pension fund system that
invests retirement funds for more than 870,000 state workers and
retirees. Its fifty-eight-billion dollar portfolio makes it the largest
pension fund in the United States and the fourth largest retirement
system of any kind in the world." CalPERS' Board consists of thir-
teen members, six elected by various employee constituencies and
8. Special situations is a catch-all category for non-traditional investments or
undervalued securities which are not otherwise categorized under either venture
capital or corporate restructuring including, but not limited to, the following
types of situations: Turnarounds - investments in companies which are insol-
vent. . . .White Knight - a friendly acquiror welcomed by the management
of a company which is the target of an unfriendly or hostile takeover at-
tempt. . . .Active Minority Positions - investments in the stock of public
companies where investors encourage management to pursue strategies that will
maximize shareholders' value. . . .Equity or Debt Infusions (including subordi-
nated debt) - investments in ventures or entities that are not otherwise classi-
fied as venture capital investments. . . .Oil and Gas and other Energy Related
Investments - investments made in the exploration, accumulation, movement,
or sale of oil or gas or other energy sources.
Memorandum from the California Public Employee's Retirement System to Members of
the Board of Administration, Agenda Item 13, Regarding 1991 Board-Sponsored Legis-
lative Program, attachment, Special Situations Investment Policy, at 13.2 (Nov. 14,
1990) (on file with author).
9. Letter from Dale M. Hanson, Chief Executive Officer of CalPERS (Oct. 4,
1990) (on file with author).
[VOL. 29: 39. 1992] The Public Piggy Bank
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
seven appointed by political officials and the state legislature. 10
The CalPERS Corporate Governance Plan for the 1991 Proxy
Season recommended sponsoring thirteen shareholder proposals
ranging from confidential voting and management compensation
committees comprised entirely of independent directors, to opting
out of Delaware's anti-takeover statute and reincorporating Pennsyl-
vania corporations in Delaware."1 The plan also recommended work-
ing informally with specific companies regarding their "problem"
areas such as management compensation, 2 corporate crime, and
shareholder votes publicizing unpopular positions. Finally, the plan
sought to "[p]romote the dissemination of corporate governance ide-
als through publication and speeches."1
The CalPERS Board, concentrating its efforts on poor economic
performers and corporations with a high percentage of institutional
investors, focused its activities on three broad types of issues:
1. Issues that impair or restrict the ability of shareholders to select
the "best" directors. Specifically, CalPERS promoted the creation of
10. The CalPERS Board consists of:
(a) One member of the State Personnel Board, selected by and serving at the
pleasure of the State Personnel Board. (b) The Director of the Department of
Personnel Administration. (c) The State Controller. (d) The State Treasurer.
(e) An official of a life insurer and an elected official of a contracting agency,
appointed by the Governor. (f) One person representing the public, appointedjointly by the Speaker of the Assembly and Senate Rules Committee. (g) Six
members elected under the supervision of the board as follows: (1) Two elected
by members of the system .... (2) [One] elected by the active state members
of the system .... (3) [One] elected by and from the active local members of
the system who are employees of a school district or a county superintendent of
schools. (4) [One] elected by and from the active local members;of the system
other than those who are employees of a school district or a county superinten-
dent of schools. (5) [One] elected by and from the retired members of the
system.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 20100 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1992). All members serve four-year
terms. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 20101 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1992).
11. Memorandum from CalPERS to Members of the CalPERS Investment Com-
mittee 18.0-18.1, Regarding Corporate Governance Plan for 1991 Proxy Season (on file
with author) [hereinafter CalPERS Corporate Governance Plan].
12. CalPERS suggested to the management of two corporations in which it owns
stock that executive compensation be monitored because the compensation was "out of
line" with the companies' financial performance. The two corporations targeted by
CalPERS were ITT and W.R. Grace & Co. Joyce Terhaar, PERS Zeroes in on Exorbi-
tant Pay for CEOs, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 11, 1990, at Cl. Both companies agreed to
adopt the CalPERS-sponsored proposals and CalPERS subsequently said it would with-
draw its resolutions. Marcia Parker, California System Drops Three Proposals, PEN-
SIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 21, 1991, at 4.
13. CalPERS Corporate Governance Plan, supra note 11, at 18.1. The plan does
not indicate the resources for these projects, such as who will give the speeches, to whom,
and at what cost.
Shareholder Advisory Committees (SACs) 14 by sponsoring share-
holder proposals and publicizing the advantages of SACs. 1
CalPERS sought to improve director quality by implementing writ-
ten nomination criteria, compensating the directors with company
stock, voting "no" on the election or nomination of certain or all
directors more frequently, and increasing shareholder participation
in the nomination process. CalPERS also promoted confidential vot-
ing by sponsoring proposals to implement confidential voting in three
different corporations, informally encouraging such voting, and con-
tinuing to ask the Securities and Exchange Commission to study the
subject. 16 Additionally, CalPERS sought to discourage the use of ab-
stentions to defeat shareholder proposals.' 7
2. Issues which impair or restrict the ability of directors to super-
vise a company's managers. Specifically, CalPERS wanted to en-
courage director independence, encourage effective oversight of
management compensation, and reduce corporate crime.18
3. Issues in which the interests of the shareholders and the compa-
nies' managers or directors may not harmonize. CalPERS decided to
discourage "poison pills" to avoid corporate takeovers,' 9 encourage
companies to opt out of state anti-takeover laws, and encourage
reincorporation out of states whose laws CalPERS believes are par-
ticularly inimical to shareholders' interests.20
14. A Shareholder Advisory Committee is a committee composed of a corpora-
tion's shareholders who want input into management decisions. It is a means to include
shareholders in the decision-making process of the board of directors.
15. SACs by definition would impose costs on corporations, thus depleting assets
otherwise available for reinvestment or dividends. SACs may also be unnecessary and
duplicative at a time when directors themselves, who are compensated with stock owner-
ship rather than cash, are aligning their interests more closely with those of their constit-
uents. As those interests converge, directors may well embrace a progressive corporate
governance approach. Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate
Governance, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1135, 1139 & nn. 21-24 (1991). Furthermore, some econo-
mists believe that SACs are superfluous because the union of the capital, managdrial
labor, and corporate control markets will spur corporate management to optimal per-
formance. See, e.g., id.; Daniel R. Fischel, The Race to the Bottom Revisited: Reflec-
tions on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REv. 913,
919 (1982); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv.
1259, 1263-64 (1982).
16. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
17. CalPERS Corporate Governance Plan, supra note 11, at 18.3-18.10.
18. CalPERS Corporate Governance Plan, supra note 11, at 18.10-18.13.
CalPERS did not define the type of crime addressed here, but could refer to fraud, pol-
luting, price fixing, collusion, or none of the above.
19. A "poison pill" is a device used to thwart a takeover attempt. "The most com-
mon pill, the 'flip-in', enables stockholders of a target company to purchase additional
shares in the firm at half price if a hostile bidder purchases more than, say, 20 percent of
the company's stock. Once triggered, the pill dilutes the target's stock and makes it pro-
hibitively expensive for a raider to seize control. William Myers, Showdown in Delaware:
The Battle to Shape Takeover Law, 23 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 64, 69 (Feb. 1989).
20. CalPERS Corporate Governance Plan, supra note 11, at 18.13-18.16. In re-
sponse to CalPERS' position on Pennsylvania's anti-takeover legislation, Catherine Baker
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Consistent with the plan, Dale Hanson, Executive Officer of
CalPERS, wrote to the Securities and Exchange Commission asking
them to alter the proxy rules under Section 14(a) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934.21 CalPERS proposed forty-eight
changes, divided into 4 categories: (i) structure and procedures, (ii)
shareholder communications, (iii) enhancement of disclosure, and
(iv) Securities and Exchange Commission filing and review of proxy
materials. CalPERS' stated goal was to "join in the dialogue of cor-
porate governance and reduce volatility and increase long-term share
values. ' 2
In addition to its corporate governance stance, in 1989 CalPERS
expressed a social responsibility policy: "To the extent companies vi-
olate laws or basic human rights, CalPERS will exercise its powers
as a shareholder to seek to eliminate such abuses. '23 This statement
Knoll, treasurer of Pennsylvania, wrote to Bill D. Ellis, president of CalPERS, asking
him not to pursue policies to thwart Pennsylvania's legislation.
21. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
22. Letter from Dale M. Hanson, Chief Executive, CalPERS, to Linda Quinn,
Director, Division of Corporate Finance, Securities & Exchange Commission (Nov. 3,
1989), reprinted in Institutional Investors: Passive Fiduciaries to Activist Owners, 1990
INST. ON PRACTICING LAW 454. In response to this proposal, one critic noted:
The inclination of corporate executives to make wealth-maximizing but risky
decisions might not be improved much by the introduction of a class of profes-
sional kibitzers who answer to financial intermediaries .... [R]isk taking lies
at the heart of the social contribution of publicly traded corporations. Risk is
an inevitable element of research and development, technological change, and
the creation of wealth. Publicly traded corporations are ideally suited for risk
taking precisely because their stock is publicly traded. The risk can thus be
born efficiently by individuals holding diversified portfolios. By revising the
proxy voting rules to favor institutional investors, we may well end up with
corporate executives who act like custodians of existing wealth, playing not to
lose rather than to win.
Robert Comment, Wimpy Directors Likely Result of Proxy Reform, WALL ST. J., Dec.
12, 1990, at A14.
23. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, WHY CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE?, at 10 (Nov. 7, 1989). Many states, California included, prohibit the pub-
lic pension funds from investing in South Africa. This prohibition has been litigated only
to a very small extent. A recent Maryland case upheld Baltimore's ordinance prohibiting
such investment by the Employees' Retirement System of Baltimore. Board of Trustees
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093
(1990). In that case, the court held that the city had not violated the Contracts Clause
because divestment did not impermissibly alter the pension fund trustees' fiduciary duties
to their beneficiaries. Id. at 101-07, 526 A.2d at 734-36. The court also held that the
trustees were only required to obtain a "'just' or 'reasonable' return while avoiding un-
due risk," not to maximize the return. Id. at 107, 562 A.2d at 737. This holding repre-
sents a dangerous step in social investment jurisprudence because it leads the courts
away from concern for the pension fund beneficiaries, for whose exclusive benefit the
funds are to be maintained. Instead, the courts are now concerned with other social mat-
ters better left to government agencies and officials accountable to the people.
gives no explanation as to what social injustices will be attacked or if
the beneficiaries have any input into which inequities CalPERS
should choose to fight. If CalPERS achieves its goals in reforming
shareholder participation, institutional investors such as itself will
have greatly increased power.
The focus of CalPERS shareholder proposals has already shifted
to the social agenda that the Board's Social Responsibility Criteria
state:
The Board's stated fiduciary duty is to obtain the highest return for the
Fund commensurate with acceptable levels, of risk. This implies that non-
financial considerations cannot take precedence to pure risk/return consid-
erations in the evaluation of investment decisions. However, action taken by
the Fund as a share-owner can be instrumental in encouraging action as a
responsible corporate citizen by the companies in which the Fund has
invested.
The Board expects the managements of the companies whose equity se-
curities are held . . . to conduct themselves with . . . a view toward social
considerations ....
If a company operates in a country or environment where serious human
rights violations occur, the Board expects to see maximum progressive prac-
tices toward elimination of these violations. For employees who are disad-
vantaged because of such violations, the Board expects the companies to
persist in availing themselves of every reasonable and legally permissible
means to ensure that all of their employees and families have what they
need to pursue a life of dignity and personal well-being. Operating in such
an environment shall carry with it special reporting burdens necessary to
keep shareholders informed. If there is apparent lack of progress, the mat-
ter shall be viewed carefully to determine if a company is implicitly acqui-
escing in other parties' repressive practices.
Should satisfaction of the Board's criteria by any company not be ade-
quate, the Board will consider what action to take . . . [including] corre-
spondence with the company, meetings with company officials, sponsoring
of shareholder resolutions or, as a last resort, liquidation of System holdings
in the company, if the sale is consistent with sound investment policy."
In California, the holding of this case is easily distinguishable from general social in-
vestment of public pension funds. As opposed to the the court's holding in Board of
Trustees, California pension trustees are required to maximize the return of their invest-
ments. Furthermore, the Baltimore case was decided partially on the basis that any harm
to the fund would be de minimus. Id. at 107, 562 A.2d at 737. This argument is weak
even in Baltimore, where the court did note that "in absolute terms, the costs of the
divestiture may be large." Id. at 107 n.36, 562 A.2d at 737 n.36. In California, the
subject is not even debatable. Even if social investment resulted in a decrease in return of
only one-half of one percent, that is equivalent to $290 million for CalPERS alone! By
no standards could this be labeled "de minimus."
The South African divestiture legislation has prompted more law review articles than
litigation. See, e.g., Ann Catherine Blank, The South African Divestment Debate: Fac-
toring "Political Risk" into the Prudent Investor Rule, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 201 (1986);
Joel C. Dobris, Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of "South African" Securi-
ties, 65 NEB. L. REv. 209 (1986); Patricia McCarroll, Socially Responsible Investment
of Public Pension Funds: The South Africa Issue and State Law, 10 REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 407 (1980-1981). Although this is a topic closely related to public pension
funds' social investment in other areas and corporate governance activist policies, further
discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
24. CalPERS, Board's Social Responsibility Criteria (June 20, 1989) addendum to
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During 1990, the CalPERS Board established policies in support
of the following environmental proposals: Valdez Principles Report,25
establishment of an environmental board committee, elimination or
reduction of fluorocarbon production, and elimination of styrofoam
use.
2 6
Although CalPERS has softened its approach to the 1992 proxy
season, the Wall Street Journal quotes Dale Hanson as saying that
the change did not herald "any change in philosophy, other than the
fact that we are going to be doing it on a lower profile."' 27 This low
key approach, which involves writing private letters to companies
and quiet negotiations, may be seen by some as a retreat from the
policies so blatantly advanced the year before.28 It is perhaps more
likely that the response to the flurry of publicity surrounding its pre-
vious actions dampened CalPERS' success. At any rate, CalPERS
has not indicated any willingness to desist in its attempts to remold
corporations in an image it feels more appropriate, nor has the fund
made any efforts to limit the extent of its noneconomic activity.
Proxy Voting Results, Fiscal Year 1989/1990, at 9.23 (emphasis added).
25. The Valdez Principles (set out in S. Con. Res. 84, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1990) (enacted)) are a ten-point guideline which creates a voluntary system of corpo-
rate self-governance. The first eight principles request that companies reduce waste, use
resources wisely, market safe products, and accept responsibility for past harm to the
environment. Points nine and ten call on companies to have at least one member on their
corporate board familiar with environmental issues and to allow annual public audits of
their environmental progress. CalPERS agreed to adhere to the Principles in their proxy
voting policy, and Cal-STRS agreed to follow points one through eight. Tracy Fine &
A.G. Block, The Valdez Principles: Is It Time to Put Bambi in the Boardroom?, CAL. J.,
Nov. 1990, at 541.
Thomas Hayes, California Governor'Pete Wilson's Director of the Department of Fi-
nance, responded as follows to the passage of the resolution:
Government has no business in a corporate board room. Our relationship with
business should focus on assuring ourselves that businesses are run in a manner
that protects our investments. Those in private industry are experts in that
arena. We should do our job - there are plenty of environmental laws for us
to enforce - and allow business to do its job, recognizing the long-term bene-
fits of environmental awareness.
Id. at 545 (Hayes' statement was made when he held the position of California State
Treasurer).
26. Memorandum from CalPERS to Members of the Investment Committee,
Agenda Item 9, Regarding Proxy Voting Results, Fiscal Year 1989/1990, at 9.2 (Sept.
18, 1990) (on file with author).
27. James A. White, Giant California Pension Fund Softens Approach to Influ-
encing Corporations, WALL ST. J., October 7, 1991, at A3.
28. Id.
B. California State Teachers' Retirement System's Plan
CaISTRS, established in the early 1900s, is California's second
largest retirement fund with a twenty-five-billion dollar portfolio.29
CalSTRS, like CalPERS, is under the authority of the Secretary of
State and Consumer Services, who reports directly to the Gover-
nor.30 CaISTRS is funded in large part by contributions from public
employer agencies and the State's general fund. To the extent these
funds are negatively affected by noneconomic investing, general tax-
payers foot the bill.31
The CalSTRS Statement of Investment Responsibility states
CalSTRS' philosophy that public retirement systems should operate
29. The Teachers' Retirement Board administers the CaISTRS fund. The Board is
composed of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Controller, the Treasurer, the
Director of Finance, a member of the governing board of a school district or community
college district, two classroom teachers (K-12), one community college teacher of busi-
ness or economics, one retirant of the system, one officer of a life insurance company, one
officer of a bank, and one member of the public. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 22200 (Deering
1989 & Supp. 1992).
30. Some CaISTRS members are appointed by the Governor, and some are elected
officials in their own right. Id. To the extent that the Governor is an elected official
accountable to the people as are the directly elected officers sitting on the Board, the
Board as a whole is (at least theoretically) accountable to the people of California.
The CaISTRS Board must annually file with the Governor and with the Sen-
ate and Assembly a report on all phases of its work which could affect the need
for public contributions for the costs of administration of the system, including
the subjects of benefits, programs, practices, procedures, and any comments on
trends and developments in the field of retirement.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 22218. The precise contents of the report are set out in great detail
in CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 22218.5-22218.7 (Deering 1989).
State statutes also provide that an independent public accountant will audit the finan-
cial statements of CaISTRS and will file a copy of the audit report with the Governor,
the Secretary of the Senate, and the Chief Clerk of the Assembly. CAL. EDUC. CODE §
22220 (Deering 1989).
31. A state statute provides that in addition to contributions from the employee
and the employing agency (taxpayer dollars), "the state shall contribute a sum certain
for a given number of years for the purpose of payment of benefits." CAL. EDUC. CODE §
22002. More specifically, § 23400 requires employing agencies to contribute monthly
eight percent of the total of all salaries upon which members salaries are based. CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 23400 (Deering Supp. 1992). Furthermore:
[Tihe General Fund . . . [w]ill transfer to the Teachers' Retirement Fund an
amount equal to 1.075 percent of the total of the salaries of the immediately
preceding calendar year upon which members' contributions are based. The
percentage shall be adjusted to reflect the contribution required to fund the
normal cost deficit when the unfunded obligation has been deemed to be elimi-
nated by the board based upon a recommendation from its actuary. If a rate
increase or decrease is required, the adjustment may be for no more than 0.25
percent per year and in no case may the transfer exceed 4.3 percent of the total
of the salaries of the immediately preceding calendar year upon which mem-
bers' contributions are based.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 23402(a) (West Supp. 1992).
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at a higher level than the private sector in social responsibility activi-
ties, and that, as a large investor, it "is in a position to exert influ-
ence on the corporations in which it has invested." 2 CalSTRS
established four main principles for its investments:
1. "The preservation of principal and maximization of income will
clearly be the primary and underlying criteria for the selection and
retention of securities. 33
2. "Noneconomic factors will supplement profit factors in making
investment decisions. . . .The consideration of non-economic fac-
tors is for the purpose of ensuring that the Retirement System...
does not promote, condone, or facilitate social injury."34
3. "Social injury" exists when basic human rights or dignities are
undermined. Specifically, this refers to equal employment opportuni-
ties, right to join a union, and equal access to housing, medical care,
transportation, recreation, and education. Social injury also occurs if
"it is the prevailing belief of the members of the Retirement System
that the practices of a corporation result in undesirable side effects
for others, and that the side effects are grave in nature." These in-
clude, among others, "[p]ractices which are known to endanger the
environment," the sale of weapons and technology to governments
which systematically suppress human rights, the sale and distribu-
tion of therapeutically ineffective or dangerous drugs, and the
purchase of goods from or sale of goods to companies known to dis-
regard worker safety.35
4. The extent of CalSTRS' responsibility in this regard is deter-
mined by the number of shares held and the gravity of the social
injury.36
Examples of CaISTRS policy include voting proxies in favor of
Echlin, Inc. withdrawing its operators from South Africa and oppos-
ing a proxy urging Proctor and Gamble to require that Integrated
Pest Management3 7 be used on all agricultural products that it
sells.38
32. Teachers' Retirement Board, State Teachers' Retirement System, Statement of
Investment Responsibility 1 (Apr. 21, 1989) (revised and adopted).
33. Id. This language written by CaISTRS is directly contradicted by the next
three principles which CaISTRS espouses. The use of non-economic measures to gauge
success is antithetical to the preservation of principal and the maximization of income.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id. at 2-3.
36. Id. at 4.
37. Integrated Pest Management is the combination of farming techniques to re-
duce the amount of pesticides used during food production.
38. Minutes, Teachers' Retirement Board Investment Committee, Jan. 5, 1990,
C. Council of Institutional Investors' Plan
The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) is a Washington,
D.C.-based group co-founded in 1985 by former California State
Treasurer Jesse Unruh. CII encompasses sixty-five mostly public
pension funds with assets exceeding three-hundred-billion dollars. Its
mission is to expand the domain of "shareholder rights" 39 and use
the coalition of institutional investors to exert influence on the corpo-
rations in which they hold stock.40 The Council was organized in
response to corporate raider T. Boone Pickens' bid for Phillips Petro-
leum, in which many CII members held stock.41 The CII members
believe that flexing the collective muscle of the pension funds in the
Item 22; Minutes, Teachers' Retirement Board Special Investment Committee Meeting,
Nov. 17, 1989, Item 13.
39. It is not immediately apparent that "shareholder rights" will benefit either the
corporation or the shareholders. There is no reason why investors, who provide the corpo-
ration with capital with the expectation of receiving dividends generated by the corpora-
tion's profits, should become corporate decision-makers. Most investors are willing to
supply capital, instead of starting and operating their own corporations, because they
trust the expertise of professional corporate management. Moreover, the risk-averse
shareholder will probably diversify his portfolio by investing in a variety of corporations
or mutual funds. An investor with such far-ranging holdings is unlikely to have the inter-
est or expertise to participate in the management of one particular corporation. Barnard,
supra note 15, at 1150 n.93.
40. [Public p]ension fund structure and investment strategies also tend to un-
dermine traditional notions of corporate democracy. . . .Fund [trustees] exer-
cise control over shares held in pension fund accounts but [the method of voting
makes it] unclear who owns the companies whose shares they hold-the ulti-
mate beneficiaries (employees) or the [state]. Thus, the applicability of share-
holder rights is equally unclear.
The overall effect may be to concentrate the exercise of corporate govern-
ance in very few hands. This would discourage participation by individual in-
vestors who may see their own views as irrelevant in the context of institutional
investors' voting power.
SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE OF THE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SEss.. REPORT ON RESTRUCTURING
FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE MAJOR POLICY ISSUES 273 (Comm. Print 1986).
41. According to accounts of the battle between T. Boone Pickens and Phil-
lips, the fate of the company was decided in large part by the key trustees of
three large public employee pension funds: the late Jesse Unruh, California's
State Treasurer, Harrison J. Goldin, New York City Comptroller, and Roland
Machold, New Jersey's pension fund investment director. At a meeting to de-
cide whether to accept management's defensive strategy, Unruh boldly, but ac-
curately, told his fellow elected officials, "Guys, in this room we control the
future of Phillips."
OUR MONEY'S WORTH, supra note 7, at 36 (citing MOIRA JOHNSTON, TAKEOVER 63
(1987)).
Sarah Teslik, Executive Director of the Council of Institutional Investors,
affirmed Unruh's analysis in her testimony to the [New York] Task Force
when she described the role public pension funds play in takeovers: "[W]e are
in fact most powerful in hostile takeover situations . . . .Someone else has
started a tender offer . . . and . . . we become the swing vote."
Id. at 36 (alterations in original) (quoting Public Hearing Before the New York State
Pension Investment Task Force, Vol. 2, at 23 (1989) (statement of Sarah Teslik, Execu-
tive Director, CII).
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marketplace is preferable to legislation.42
The Executive Committee of the CII determined the following
course of action:
1. To "strengthen" boards of directors ("reform" was the original
word chosen) by electing independent directors and requiring compa-
nies to establish nominating committees composed of outside and in-
dependent directors. 43
2. To revise the dues plan of the council.44 Dues paid by public
institutions like CalPERS consist of public funds.
The Strategic Planning Committee of the CII discussed the role of
the committee and the balance between a purely educational role
and an aggressively active role. Some members thought that the en-
tity should educate and coordinate among members and assist indi-
vidual members to draft policy and to take appropriate
implementing actions. Others (including Dale Hanson, Executive Of-
ficer of CalPERS) cautioned that the CII could lose its purpose and
the value of its collective clout if its functions were too tightly
constrained.45
III. LAWS IMPLICATED BY INVESTING IN CORPORATIONS
The plans set forth above manifest an agenda that goes far beyond
obtaining the best financial return for pensioners. These agenda
place the investment strategies of the pension trustees on a collision
course with numerous federal and state constitutional provisions and
statutes.
42. Bill Blum & Gina Lobaco, The Pension Fund Game, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1985,
at 41, 76.
43. Minutes, Executive Committee Meeting, Council of Institutional Investors
Strategic Planning Committee Meeting, July 9, 1990, at 1-3.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Minutes, Council of Institutional Investors Strategic Planning Committee
Meeting, July 9, 1990, at 1-3. The New York City pension funds, which are members of
CII and managed by the state controller, Elizabeth Holtzman, do not feel at all con-
strained to restrict their activities to those which benefit their pensioners. Ms. Holtzman,
in a speech to the Corporate Governance and Proxy Voting Conference in New York
City, emphasized her commitment, as pension fund trustee, to support corporations that
donate money to Planned Parenthood and to pressure those that do not so donate into
funding that organization. Memorandum from Richard W. Koppes, General Counsel,
CalPERS, to Members of the Board of Administration, Regarding Corporate Govern-
ance Speeches, attachment at 14-17 (Nov. 29, 1990) (on file with author). That a public
pension fund should use its clout to extort contributions from private corporations to
controversial, issue-oriented interest groups is incredible. The speech demonstrates just
how far some pension plan systems are willing to go to further their social agenda.
A. Federal
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 is a filing
requirement for shareholders who have acquired over five percent of
a corporation's stock. The law indicates that an institutional investor
can avoid the filing requirements only if it has no purpose of "chang-
ing or influencing control of the issuer. ' ', 7
The same section, and the rules promulgated thereunder, also pro-
vide that holders of more than five percent of a class of equity secur-
ities of an issuer registered under the 1934 Act who join forces for
the purpose of voting the securities held by them are regarded as a
"group. ' 48 Groups are required to file a Schedule 13D setting forth
considerable information including the members of the group and
the purpose of their acquisition of shares, unless they can establish
that they are not acting to "influence" control of the issuer.49 The
members of the Council of Institutional Investors, therefore, must
carefully watch the types of communications between its members.
Otherwise, such communications may cross the line established by
these rules, rendering the institutional investors liable for a
violation. 50
2. Clayton Act
Section 7A of the Clayton Act"' is also a filing requirement that
deters active participation by institutional investors. The statute re-
quires a party who intends to acquire a significant amount of an is-
suer's voting stock to file a long notification form and wait thirty
days before actually acquiring the stock. Institutional investors are
exempted from this statute if their acquisition is "solely for the pur-
pose of investment"52 and involves either less than fifteen percent of
outstanding stock or securities valued at less than twenty-five million
dollars. "Solely for the purpose of investment" requires that the in-
vestor have "no intention of participating in the formulation, deter-
mination, or direction of the basic business decisions of the issue.15 3
46. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988 & Supp. 1989).
47. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-l(b)(1), 240.13d-5(b)(2) (1988); Alfred F. Conard, Be-
yond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 117, 162 (1988).
48. SEC Rule 13d-5(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(l) (1991).
49. SEC Rule 13d-l(b)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(1)(i) (1991).
50. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance in the Nineties: Managers v. Institu-
tions, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 357, 364 nn. 41-43 (1990).
51. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9); section 7A(d) of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18a(d) (1988 & Supp. 1989) (added by Section 201 of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1390 (1976)).
52. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(i)(1) (1991).
53. Id.
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If a person holds stock "solely for the purpose of investment" and
thereafter decides to influence or participate in management of the
issuer of that stock, the stock is no longer held "solely for the pur-
pose of investment."5 Nominating a candidate for the board of di-
rectors may constitute conduct inconsistent with an investment
intent.
3. The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) 55 protects private employee pension rights through stan-
dards for the conduct of plan trustees and asset managers who are*
required to invest pension funds prudently and solely in the interest
of plan participants and beneficiaries. The fiduciary responsibilities
set forth in ERISA are often used as the model for public pension
systems. ERISA case law may be analogized to the issues here.56
The Department of Labor, which enforces ERISA, addressed the
implications of social investing by pension plans in the late 1970s.
The Administrator of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs at the
Department of Labor, at that time Ian Lanoff, set forth the depart-
mental position on this subject which has remained unchanged to the
present time: "If the socially beneficial investment meets objective
investment criteria which are appropriate to the goals of the portfo-
lio, it may be considered in the same manner as other investments
which meet these criteria .... 157
That is, if an investment alternative meets a pension plan's objec-tives for portfolio asset mix and rate of return, then the fact that it
54. Id.
55. Codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
56. It should be noted that the situation of officials responsible for the administra-
tion of public funds significantly differs from the private plans. Sponsors of private plans
closely scrutinize the success or failure of the investment policies of their fund managers
and if the policies are not as successful as the sponsor deems appropriate, the manager is
often quickly replaced. Private pension fund managers are also susceptible to criticism by
the sponsors regarding the manner in which they exercise their proxy votes. For public
fund trustees, who are usually elected public officials or persons answerable to public
officials, the fear of sudden joblessness is not nearly so pervasive. While the governmental
entities contributing to such funds are obviously concerned with investment results be-
cause most public plans are defined benefit plans and poor performance requires larger
contributions, performance and voting practices of trustees are not likely to be as closely
monitored as their private counterparts. Therefore, public fund trustees have greater
freedom to use their proxy votes aggressively without criticism and without concern for
their positions. Sommer, supra note 50, at 368 n.28.
57. PUBLIC PENSION PLANS, supra note 1, at 46.
was also selected for noninvestment reasons would not cause its ex-
clusion from consideration for investment. Choices of socially benefi-
cial investments cannot override the basic imperative that a portfolio
be diversified to minimize risk of market or credit losses. The basic
rule on social investing, then, is this: If two investments are equal in
relative risk and return, then the prudent trustee may choose the
socially responsible investment. If, however, the socially responsible
investment involves greater risk or smaller return, then it would be
imprudent.5
A trustee who breaches a fiduciary duty is personally liable to
make good to the plan any losses resulting from the breach and may
be removed from his or her position.59 Furthermore, the trustee may
be subject to criminal penalties including a $5,000 fine, a year of
imprisonment, or both.6 0 Additionally, pension plan participants or
beneficiaries may bring civil actions in federal district court"1 to re-
cover benefits due to them, to enforce their rights, or to clarify their
rights to future benefits.62
4. Internal Revenue Code
Public plans must follow the requirements of section 401(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which states that there must be a
plan, the assets of which are maintained in a trust for the exclusive
benefit of the employees or their beneficiaries.6" The trust document
must prohibit using any part of the corpus or income for purposes
other than the exclusive benefit of the employees or their benefi-
ciaries.64 If these requirements are not met, the Internal Revenue
58. Id.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1988 & Supp. 1989).
60. Id. § 1131.
61. Id. § 1132(e).
62. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
63. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988 & Supp. 1989). If a pension plan qualifies under §
401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, three major tax benefits for employees, employers,
and their pension plans result:
(1) The employer's contributions to the plan are deductible when made, even
if the employee is not vested in them at the time,
(2) the earnings of the pension trust funds are not taxed currently
(3) the contributions made by an employer to a plan on behalf of an em-
ployee are not currently imputed to the employee, even if vested.
Kathleen Paisley, Public Pension Funds: The Need for Federal Regulation of Trustee
Investment Decisions, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 188, 191-92 n.19 (1985). Also, partici-
pants who receive lump-sum distributions from a qualified plan get a tax break. Id. Only
one of these benefits applies to public plans: deferral of the recognition of income by the
employee. Id. The other benefits will inure to public pension plans in any case because
they are generally exempt from federal taxes. Id. See also New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572 (1946).
64. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1989).
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Service (IRS) may disqualify the plan, resulting in denial to employ-
ees of tax deferrals on the employer's contributions. Disqualification
is rarely invoked because the target could be only an innocent by-
stander, not the miscreant pension fund administrator. Furthermore,
"[o]ther than requests for rulings submitted by the plans themselves,
the IRS currently has no mechanism for determining if a public plan
is in compliance with the rules or not."65
The IRS has stated that the exclusive benefit rule is the prime
requirement for qualification under IRC section 401(a).66 The IRS
lists several factors that should be considered in determining whether
a trust is qualified: the cost of assets must not exceed fair market
value at the time of purchase, a fair return commensurate with the
prevailing rate must be provided, sufficient liquidity must be main-
tained to permit distributions in accordance with the terms of the
plan, the safeguards and diversity to which a prudent investor would
adhere must be present, and the trustees should give effect to the
trust instrument.67
Social investment, including investments targeted to enhance the
economic development of a state or locality, are not specifically pro-
hibited by the exclusive benefit rule as interpreted and enforced by
the IRS. The trustees may consider the general welfare or local eco-
nomic benefit in an investment so long as they follow the IRS's "ex-
clusive benefit" guidelines. Prudent investors may have a small
percentage of speculative investments in a portfolio.
5. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
Public pension fund trustees are fiduciaries acting in a situation
where public employees are forced to have their pension funds placed
with those fiduciaries. Should the trustees invest those funds to fur-
ther ideological or political goals, such action would violate the
speech and association rights of the beneficiaries.
The United States Supreme Court in Keller v. State Bar of Cali-
fornia68 declared unconstitutional under the First Amendment the
California Bar's use of an objector's compelled dues for purposes not
65. PUBLIC PENSION PLANS, supra note 1, at 39.
66. Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88; 4 IRS Manual (CCH), Examination Guide-
lines Handbook § 711.1.
67. These same factors are reiterated in Rev. Rul. 73-380, 1973-2 C.B. 124, and
Rev. Rul. 73-532, 1973-2 C.B. 128, noted in PUBLIC PENSION PLANS, supra note 1, at 38
n.36.
68. 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990).
germane to regulating the legal profession or improving the quality
of legal services. 69 Similarly, public pension fund trustees are obli-
gated to invest the funds for the exclusive benefit of the beneficiaries
and to further the integrity of the fund itself. Forays into social in-
vesting or corporate governance that do not bring the highest finan-
cial return to the pensioners, and which policies the pensioners
themselves may in fact oppose,"0 implicate the freedom of speech
and freedom of association clauses of the First Amendment.
[J]ust as prohibitions on making contributions to organizations for politi-
cal purposes implicate fundamental First Amendment concerns . . . "com-
pelled . . . contributions for political purposes works no less an
infringement of . . . constitutional rights." . . . "[T]o compel a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."7 1
Although the facts of Keller involve the compulsory contributions of
attorneys to the state Bar, the holding of the case is far broader. 2
The primary issue is not the context in which the contributions were
compelled, but that the contributions were compulsory. In the con-
text of the public pension framework, public employees do not have
the option of stashing away a few dollars each week in the mattress
at home; rather, they are required to contribute a portion of their
salary to the state retirement system. In this way, the employees'
compulsory contributions to the state are analogous to the attorneys'
compulsory contributions to the Bar.73
Because the employee's payment of funds into the retirement sys-
tem is mandatory, those funds may not be used to further political or
ideological activities. Even if political expenditures were distributed
69. Id. at 2238.
70. In the situation discussed in this article, investments are made for political or
social reasons, with the incidental effect that the pensioners may get some (although
probably decreased) economic gain. In the inverse case, in which pensioners who wish to
invest only in companies that have political agendas with which they agree allege a viola-
tion of their freedom of speech, the Keller issue is not presented. Conversely, investments
made on purely economic grounds will produce the greatest monetary gain (the purpose
of a pension fund) with the incidental effect that some of the investments will be in
companies which hold views antithetical to the pensioner's preferences.
71. Id. at 2234 (citations omitted).
72. See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); Lathrop v. Don-
ohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Keller,
110 S. Ct. at 2236.
73. The wide diversity of members in the public pension system ensures that
whatever social or political positions the system supports, it will offend a certain percent-
age of its members. Although this certainty of offending some members all of the time
builds a stronger case against the non-economic investment of pension funds, the argu-
ment is valid even if only one person disagrees with the political activities of the fund.
That one person should not be forced to subsidize political or ideological activities with
which he disagrees.
[VOL. 29: 39. 1992] The Public Piggy Bank
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
in such a way as to promote all political viewpoints, Keller specifi-
cally states that no compulsory contributions may be spent on politi-
cal or ideological activities. The fact that such contributions are
spent on political and ideological activities of every stripe and color
only compounds the offense; it does not mitigate it.7 4
In the pension context, the fact that investment on noneconomic
bases may result in some return to the pensioner does not alter the
fact that the compulsory contributions were used not solely for eco-
nomic gain (as is required), but to further political views. The return
on the investment is irrelevant to this argument.
B. State
Section 17, article XVI, of the California Constitution, provides
that, apart from reasonable administrative costs, the only purpose for
which the trust assets can be used is the delivery of retirement bene-
fits. This provision also contains the sole and exclusive purpose rule
which imposes on fund trustees the legal obligation to perform their
duties solely in the interest of plan beneficiaries. Furthermore, the
trustee will be held personally liable and held to a "prudent inves-
tor" standard. 75 The trustee must diversify investments so as to mini-
mize risk.76
74. The United States Supreme Court has emphatically stated that one need not
object to each and every political use of the compelled contribution. An objection to any
political expenditure is sufficient for First Amendment protection. Abood, 431 U.S. at
239, (citing Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 118 (1963)).
Implicit in this rule is the Court's protection of political anonymity, a well-established
subpart of the freedom of association. See, e.g., National Ass'n for the Advancement of
Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960).
75. Section 17, article XVI, of the California Constitution was amended with the
passage of Proposition 21 on June 5, 1984. The argument to the voters in favor of Pro-
position 21 on the sample ballot stated that it was written to give public pension assets
full constitutional protection as trust funds and provide that neither the governor nor
future legislatures would ever be able to use this money for other purposes. Ballot Pamp.,
Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Primary Elec. (June 5,
1984), argument in favor of Prop. 21, at 24-27. These elements of the pension trustee's
duties are the same as those in ERISA.
76. All investments are made by balancing the competing factors of risk and re-
turn. Investors are presumed to be risk-averse, which means that given two investments
with the same expected return, the investor will choose the one with lower risk. Investors
*will pay more for a stable investment, one that has very little risk, e.g., "blue-chip"
stocks. There are two types of risk: systemic and unsystemic. Unsystemic risk occurs
when an investor puts all his eggs into one basket. The cure is diversification. Systemic
risk is correlated to market performance (as goes the market, so go individual stocks).
Diversification cannot cure systemic risk, but it may help reduce that risk. Paisley, supra
note 63, at 204 nn. 82-86.
The diversification language indicates that investing in-state just
for the sake of doing so does not diversify to minimize risk, espe-
cially when the trustee is held to the higher prudent investor stan-
dard. In general, social investing constrains the pension fund
trustees' choice of investments by disallowing investment in certain
corporations for noneconomic reasons. Thus, it creates a more vola-
tile stock portfolio and increases the risk of harm to pensioners.
California state statutes, beginning with Government Code section
20200, regulate the administration of public pension funds. The state
employees retirement fund is a trust fund created solely for the bene-
fit of the members and retired members of CalPERS and their survi-
vors and beneficiaries. The California courts have addressed these
code sections, concluding:
Once paid, appropriated employer contributions constitute a trust fund
held solely for the benefit of [Cal]PERS members and beneficiaries (§
20200). Income in excess of interest credited to employee and employer ac-
counts is to be retained in that trust fund as a reserve against deficiencies.
The reserve constitutes an integral part of that trust fund (§ 20203). Conse-
quently, none of the funds within [Cal]PERS including those in the reserve
against deficiencies, may be appropriated for a general public purpose unre-
lated to the benefit of [Cal]PERS members. . ., because funds received
into the treasury for special trust purposes are "in their nature a continuing
appropriation for a specific purpose."78
These code sections, in conjunction with the state constitution, pro-
vide clear guidance to fund trustees as to the limits of their authority
and their duties to the fund.
IV. ISSUES ARISING UNDER THE LAWS
This section identifies some of the legal theories and issues under-
lying social investment policies of pension funds.
A. Fiduciary Duty
Section 17(b), article XVI, of the California Constitution ex-
pressly establishes a fiduciary standard of conduct. This constitu-
tional dimension is controlling. The assets of a public pension or
retirement system are constitutionally designated as trust funds for
exclusive purposes and may not be deemed or treated otherwise by
statute. 9 Under general trust principles, a violation by a trustee,
whether fraudulent or through negligence, or arising through mere
oversight or forgetfulness, is a breach of trust.80 As a result, "the
77. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 20200, 20205.8 (Deering 1992).
78. Valdes v. Cory, 139 Cal. App. 3d 773, 788, 189 Cal. Rptr. 212, 224 (1983)
(citations omitted).
79. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. 81, 85 (1988).
80. See generally E. DEPPER & A. BERNSTEIN, CALIFORNIA TRUST ADMINISTRA-
TION §§ 3.1-3.59, 14.19-14.50 (1990).
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trustee may be charged with the rents, profits, and income which
[the trust] never in fact received, but which [the trust] might and
should have received by the exercise of due and reasonable care and
diligence."81 As applied to CalPERS, the California attorney general
wrote that breach of fiduciary duty causing a loss to the fund gives
rise to an action at law by the beneficiaries of the fund against the
miscreant board member, officer, or employee to restore the loss.82
The California Supreme Court wrote that "expenditures by an ad-
ministrative official are proper only insofar as they are authorized,
explicitly or implicitly, by legislative enactment. . . .[S]uch execu-
tive officials are not free to spend public funds for any 'public pur-
pose' they may choose, but must utilize appropriated funds in
accordance with the legislatively designated purpose."'83 Further-
more, the court held the public official personally liable for improper
expenditures.84
In New York and Wisconsin, courts have held that if the legisla-
ture appropriated any of the Public Employees' Retirement System
(PERS) trust funds for purposes unrelated to the benefit of PERS
members, for example, to balance the state budget and avoid a year-
end deficit, this legislative action would clearly modify vested rights
of PERS members.85 Moreover, all the profits of a trust are subject
81. White v. Citizens Nat'l Trust and Say. Bank, 46 Cal. App. 2d 418, 422, 116
P.2d 117, 119 (1941).
82. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. 129, 131 (1988).
83. Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 213, 551 P.2d 1, 6, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 702
(1976).
84. Id. at 226-27, 551 P.2d at 15, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 711. A side issue presented by
this discussion is the advisability of state representatives acting in the capacity of plan
trustees. Certain state officials are directly responsible to the people via the ballot box.
This may or may not be in the pension plan's best interest. Because they are politically
accountable, public officials may act as if their duty lay with the state or locality as a
whole, rather than solely with the pensioners and beneficiaries. Although this violation of
fiduciary duty should provide reason enough for their removal as trustee, there exists the
possibility that the population as a whole, which has more power than public employees,
would prefer to have certain non-economic benefit programs (such as in-state investing)
in place. Public employees alone do not have the voting strength to oust a statewide
official. An additional concern is that by the time the detrimental effects are apparent(when the employees retire), the particular public official who pursued policies adverse to
the plan's interest may well have left public office. Paisley, supra note 63, at 224 nn.
222-25. The converse argument is that the pension funds are simply too massive and
represent the future livelihood of too many people to permit trustees who are wholly
unaccountable to the electorate to handle those funds. The solution may lay in a compro-
mise between the two, but that is an issue beyond the scope of this article.
85. Sgaglione v. Levitt, 337 N.E.2d 592, 37 N.Y.2d 507, 37 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975);
State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Giessel, 106 N.W.2d 301, 12 Wis. 2d 5 (1960); cf.
Whitmire v. City of Eureka, 29 Cal. App. 3d 28, 34, 105 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189 (1972).
to the furtherance of the trust purposes. "Where a trust is constitu-
tionally established for a designated purpose, neither the principal
nor its proceeds may be statutorily diverted. Such proceeds "con-
stitut[e] a part of the fund" within the meaning of Government
Code section 20203. 86
B. The New York City Catastrophe
New York state public pension plans invested heavily in New
York City municipal bonds to move the city back from the brink of
bankruptcy in 1975. After pension funds were used in such a matter,
fund trustees favoring social investing cited that event for the pro-
position that socioeconomic concerns other than the exclusive benefit
of the pensioners may be used in investment decisions. This view was
incorrect.
Repeatedly emphasizing that this was a special situation, that the
legislation was necessary for the New York bailout to succeed and
that the legislation should not be interpreted as precedent for other
governmental or private plans in similar circumstances, Congress
passed Public Law No. 94-236.87 The law provided that any pension
plan or trust which was a party to the agreement to purchase Munic-
ipal Assistance Corporation securities would not be considered to
have violated the exclusive benefit rule or to have engaged in a pro-
hibited transaction because of actions taken pursuant to the agree-
ment. 8 The report of the Committee on Ways and Means"
indicates that the bill was part of the New York City bailout, and it
was not intended as a precedent for any private pension plans or for
other governmental pension plans being exempted from the exclusive
benefit or prohibited transactions rules of the tax law.90
C. In-State Investment Policies
California and twenty-four other states have formal programs re-
quiring that a certain percentage of public pension funds be invested
in-state.0" The purpose of the programs is to shore up sagging local
economies. The trade-off is often a lower return on the investment. 2
86. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. at 88 (1988) (alteration in original).
87. Act of Mar. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-236, 90 Stat. 238 (1976).
88. Id.
89. H.R. REP. No. 851, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
90. PUBLIC PENSION PLANS, supra note 1, at 41-42.
91. Boyce Thompson, Politicians Lust After the Half-Trillion-Dollar Pension
Fund Bonanza, GOVERNING, Jan. 1989, at 48-50.
92. This phenomenon is not newly discovered. In the mid-1980s, a law review arti-
cle set forth three other difficulties with local investments beyond the diversification prob-
lem already noted:
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CalPERS is required to put twenty-five percent of new funds in Cali-
fornia residential mortgages unless better investments can be found
elsewhere.9 3 The Pennsylvania State Employment Retirement Sys-
tem earmarks for in-state placement half of its new venture capital
investment, half of its new investments in residential and commercial
mortgages, and half of its new direct investments in commercial real
estate, where it actually buys buildings rather than merely financing
them."'
The danger with in-state investing is that it amounts to a subsidy
when the pension fund does not get a market-competitive yield.
There may be some long-run benefit to the employee, if the invest-
ment makes the state economy more buoyant, which in turn may
make for a more solvent state or local government. But in the short
or intermediate run, in-state investment works to the detriment of
the pension system. Investing too heavily in a single state makes a
pension fund vulnerable to a regional or local recession. If assets are
diversified geographically, then a downturn in one area that ad-
versely affects the market value of investments may be offset by a
strong economy and good investment results in another area. 95
•.. Second, locally targeted investment may increase administrative costs, re-
sulting in a lower net return to the fund. Third, government-sponsored securi-
ties such as municipal bonds pay lower returns because they are tax exempt.
Public pension funds are also tax exempt, however, and are therefore accepting
lower returns with no corresponding benefit. Fourth, to the extent that public
pension plans are willing to invest in local enterprise, the market may not ad-
just returns to reflect investment risks.
Paisley, supra note 63, at 198-99 (citations omitted). The author concluded that "al-
though local investments may serve an arguably legitimate political purpose, they gener-
ally either subject fund participants to additional risk or result in lower returns." Id. at
199. The same article conceded that local investments may result in some non-economic
benefits, but concluded that non-economic returns are inappropriate for a public pension
fund because there is no reasonable way to calculate non-economic benefits in a way that
can be analyzed as against economic benefits. The article also concluded that public pen-
sions are not the appropriate vehicles for non-economic policy decisions. Id.
93. Thompson, supra note 91, at 50.
94. Id.
95. Some may question whether the needs of general taxpayers should alter this
analysis because taxpayers ultimately bear the costs of providing for public pension
funds. On the one hand, if pension benefits are deemed deferred compensation, then the
public pension funds held in trust for participants are of no relevance to the general
taxpayer. On the other hand, if the needs of taxpayers are to be considered, it is not in
their best interest for public pension funds to select locally targeted investments that
increase risk or lower return for the fund, resulting in higher funding needs which must
be met through taxation. Taxpayers would be better off if social policies were accom-
plished through the political process in which they have a direct voice. It is not a valid
function of public pension funds to make policy decisions about which social goals to
pursue with taxpayer dollars. Marcia Gaughan Murphy, Regulating Public Employee
V. RESPONDING TO SOCIAL INVESTMENT
Those affected by public pension systems' social investment may
challenge these activities on two fronts. First, a pensioner or other
party directly harmed by the decrease in investment return may
commence litigation to redress the harm and prevent it from occur-
ring in the future. Second, because pension system administration is
lodged in the executive branch of state government, alarmed pen-
sioners may address their concerns to the governor of their state.
Because laws prohibiting the kinds of social investment described in
this article already exist, lobbying for more stringent controls is al-
ways a viable option.
A. Legal Action
Pensioners, beneficiaries, or taxpayers may pursue legal action
against the public pension funds to enjoin them from making invest-
ments that are not for the exclusive benefit of the retirees. Such suit
could be brought under one or more of the federal or state constitu-
tions or statutes set forth above.98
In California, CalPERS pensioners or beneficiaries have standing
to sue any CalPERS board member, officer, or employee who can be
traced to have caused a loss to the fund to restore that loss. They
may also sue CalPERS for injunctive relief, to enjoin CalPERS from
engaging in certain kinds of investments, or from taking an active
shareholder role. A class action may be appropriate here, although
given the different interests of certain pensioners or beneficiaries,
subclasses may be advisable. 97 A pensioner suing on the constitu-
tional fiduciary duty cause of action would have to show that
CalPERS actions are not those of a "prudent investor" and that the
pension fund has lost money or security on the investments. Taxpay-
ers may also sue on a theory that the investment of pension funds in
certain projects is little more than a mechanism for circumventing
Retirement Systems for Portfolio Efficiency, 67 MINN. L. REv. 211, 255-57 (1982).
96. As yet, there have not been any prosecutions or suits on behalf of fund mem-
bers for violations of the constitutional and statutory provisions set forth in this article.
The reason may be simply economic. Whether a fund is achieving the maximum return
on its investments is a question that is not easily answered, especially in times of reces-
sion. Furthermore, a suit would be prohibitively expensive for virtually all private plain-
tiffs. The actual economic stake a pensioner would have in the litigation would be
insufficient to warrant challenging such a powerful and well-financed foe.
97. Plaintiffs bringing a suit would have to be aware of different interests or goals
that may exist among themselves. The interests of current employees may conflict with
the interests of retirees; younger employees may differ with older employees. For in-
stance, a proposal to loan a city some money to prevent insolvency may be opposed by
retirees, who are concerned with the short-term goal of receiving their pensions, but fa-
vored by current employees, who see the preservation of pension funds as a useless goal if
they lose their jobs.
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an electorate that is reluctant to commit current or future tax dollars
to those projects.
Federal law causes of action may also be pursued. Because the
corporate governance policies of the public pension funds emphasize
influencing the management of the company and repudiating any no-
tion that they have bought stock solely for the purpose of investment,
the pension systems are not entitled to exemption from the 1934 Act
or Clayton Act reporting and filing requirements. Private claims may
be brought under the 1934 Act by shareholders98 or the issuing cor-
poration. 9 Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that any person
injured in his business or property may sue in any Circuit Court of
the United States. However, the Supreme Court has formulated a
series of factors to determine standing.100 These factors make it more
difficult, though certainly not impossible, for a pensioner to possess
standing to sue the pension system.
Although ERISA and IRC may have some bearing on the issue of
public pension funds, the IRC remedy harms rather than benefits
individual pensioners and ERISA can only be used by analogy.10
However, ERISA case law is directly analogous to public pension
fund issues and strongly supports the concept that investments
should be made for the exclusive benefit of the pensioners. Neither
ERISA nor the IRC recognize public pension funds as a means for
curing societal ills.
Finally, as noted above, individuals objecting to the use of their
retirement funds for social investments have standing to sue under
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
B. Gubernatorial or Executive Action
Each state has its own method of appointing trustees to the board
of its statewide public pensions. In most states, the governor appoints
98. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 910 (1972).
99. Portsmouth Square, Inc. v. Shareholders Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866,
871-72 (9th Cir. 1985).
100. The factors are: (1) the motive of the defendant-whether defendant specifi-
cally intended to cause plaintiff harm; (2) the nature of plaintiff's injury-whether the
harm was of a type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent; (3) the directness of the
causal connection between the violation and the injury; (4) the extent to which abstract
speculation underlies the allegations of injury and of their causation by defendant's anti-
trust violations; and (5) the risk of duplicate recoveries or complex apportionment of
damages if these plaintiffs are permitted to recover. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cali-
fornia State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537-45 (1983).
101. See supra part III.A.3.
some, if not all, of the pension fund trustees."0 2 Regardless of the
appointing body,103 once the board of trustees is formed, the over-
sight of the pension system resides in the executive branch. There-
fore, pensioners and beneficiaries may look to the governor, the head
of the executive branch, to respond to the public pension systems'
improper investment of funds. The focus of any gubernatorial action
must be to pull the systems back into line with their duties, as re-
quired by the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and appli-
cable state law.
To this end, governors have two main methods to implement this
policy. The first is to draft an Executive Order that exposes the so-
cial investment policies of the pension systems, lists the various state
and federal laws that such policies violate, and orders cessation of
the activity. The second is to approach this problem publicly. Public
statements from the governor will make the systems aware that their
activities have not gone unnoticed. The governor or others in the ex-
ecutive branch may pressure pension fund administrators to keep
their investments within the letter of the law by using methods such
as press conferences, letters to pensioners and beneficiaries explain-
ing the potential harm being done to their retirement funds, and ap-
pointing members to the pension system board of trustees who
adhere to the philosophy that it is their sole function to protect and
increase the retirement funds.
VI. CONCLUSION
The state originally conceived of the corporate form of organiza-
tion as an effective and efficient way to promote economic growth.
This growth created higher standards of living, employment opportu-
nities, and the ability to attract the financial and organizational
human resources needed to continue the growth. The economic free-
dom provided by the corporate charter is a fundamental underpin-
ning of the political freedom we enjoy in the United States. It is a
simple matter to observe the various economic and political systems
around the world to confirm the close connection of political and eco-
nomic freedom.
In contrast to this line of thought, some public pension fund trust-
ees believe their social agenda is also good economics. They are mis-
taken. Non-economic issues should be decided on election day by the
102. PUBLIC PENSION PLANS, supra note I, at 23-25; OUR MONEY'S WORTH,
supra note 7, at 52.
103. Appointments may be made by the legislature, the governor (or some other
member of the executive branch), or some combination of the two.
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voters' choice of legislators or initiatives. Public pension fund trust-
ees must not be allowed to determine on their own what they con-
sider to be proper social use of public retirement funds which are
composed of the taxes that everyone must pay. Pension fund manag-
ers do not have the accountability of elected officials, and individual
pensioners are disenfranchised because they have no vote in the po-
litical decisions issued by their boards using the power of the massive
accumulation of money earmarked for member retirement.
Responsible elected officials and individuals (whether pensioners,
beneficiaries, or taxpayers) must make a concerted effort to hold the
public pension fund trustees in check. The stakes are simply too high
to permit retirement funds to be used to promote a social agenda
which places the financial returns in jeopardy and implants unac-
ceptable governmental intervention into the workings of private
corporations.

